Inconvenience is one popular explanation for why many individuals do not receive the social bene…ts for which they are eligible. Applications take time and some individuals may decide that the …nancial bene…ts do not outweigh these time costs. This paper investigates this explanation using cross-state variation in administrative changes that made applying for Unemployment Insurance (UI) bene…ts substantially more convenient over the past decade. We …nd that the introduction of phone-and internet-based claiming did not have an appreciable impact on overall UI take-up, nor did it lead to a shift towards recipients that are higher income or likely to be receiving the maximum bene…t amount. These …ndings are inconsistent with a time-and transaction-cost explanation for low take-up if remote UI claiming is indeed less time-intensive, as claimant surveys suggest.
Introduction
Participation varies considerably across most social programs in the United States and is generally less than complete. In her extensive survey of the empirical evidence, Currie (2006) …nds that take-up rates for means tested programs range from very low (8-14% for State Children's Health Insurance Program) to relatively high (82-87% for the Earned Income Tax Credit and 60-90% for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families), with most other major social programs falling somewhere in between. Take-up of non means-tested programs is generally higher (nearly 100% for Medicare), but often far from complete (72-83% for unemployment insurance). The latter is particularly puzzling if one expects the stigma associated with participation in non means-tested programs to be lower than that associated with means-tested ones. She concludes that concrete transaction costs -including inconvenience -must also be a major determinant of participation in social programs among those eligible.
Most research on take-up has focused on monetary incentives. 1 However, there is a small but growing body of recent work suggesting that non-monetary program features such as application complexity, default or automatic enrollment, or mandated in-person interviews may also be an important factor in participation. 2 In this paper, we examine the take-up consequences of the recent introduction of phone-and internet-based claiming for unemployment insurance (UI), which greatly reduced the time required to …le for UI bene…ts. 3 While almost all unemployed workers were historically required to initially apply for UI bene…ts in person, now only thirteen percent do.
We exploit cross-state variation in the timing of these changes to identify the e¤ect of inconvenience on the number and characteristics of UI recipients. The present study is most closely related to that of Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches (2007) , who …nd that the introduction of electronic state tax 1 For example, McCall (1995) and Anderson and Meyer (1997) …nd strong e¤ects of bene…t levels on take-up of unemployment insurance. Daponte, Sanders, and Taylor (1999) …nd that poor information partially explains Food Stamps non-participation, but that poor information is most common among those whose potential bene…ts are low. 2 In their survey, Remler, Rachline, and Glied (2001) highlight the importance of non-monetary program features to take-up. …nd that Medicaid administrative reforms did not increase use of prenatal services but Bansak and Raphael (2006) identify several non-monetary design features of SCHIP that have signi…cant e¤ects on take-up including simplifying the application and renewal processes. …nd that longer recerti…cation intervals increase Food Stamps participation among single parents. In the area of retirement savings, see Madrian and Shea (2001) on the importance of automatic/default enrollment and Saez (2007) on the importance of program framing. 3 Needels et al. (2000) report results from claimant surveys that suggest considerable time savings. Marcus and Frees (1998) report results from a nationwide survey of 2,773 claimants, where respondents estimated that it took 11 minutes to …le an initial claim by telephone and 61 minutes to …le in-person.
…ling had a large e¤ect on participation in the EITC.
We …nd that the aggregate unemployment insurance take-up rate has increased slightly over the past decade and a half, in contrast to the declining take-up observed in the 1980's. 4 This trend coincides with dramatic changes in the ease of applying for bene…ts and, more recently, increases in bene…t levels and a shift towards more educated unemployed workers. However, statelevel estimates suggest that increased ease of …ling is not behind this aggregate take-up trend.
The fraction of unemployed who are on UI has no relationship to the introduction of phone-or internet-based claiming or to the closing of UI o¢ ces. This result is robust to controls for state and year e¤ects, characteristics of the unemployed, and the maximum bene…t amount. Regressions using estimated take-up as a dependent variable are generally consistent with this …nding, but are much less precise due to measurement error in our estimates of the fraction of unemployed who are eligible for UI.
We also …nd little evidence of a shift towards higher-wage claimants resulting from reduced UI application time, as a time-cost explanation for low take-up would predict. The introduction of phone claiming had no e¤ect on the fraction of claimants receiving the maximum bene…t, the average and distribution of pre-unemployment wage, or claimant education. The only exception to this pattern for internet claiming is an increase in the proportion receiving the maximum bene…t when internet claiming is introduced. The primary e¤ect of the introduction of remote claiming technology was to reduce states' payroll costs, but with no e¤ect on the number or pool of UI participants. This …nding leaves incomplete UI take-up an unresolved puzzle and points to incomplete information about eligibility or application processes, rather than inconvenience, as possible explanations.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents recent trends in UI participation and provides background on UI claiming procedures in the US. Section 3 describes our data and empirical approach. Results are reported in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 4 See Blank and Card (1991) for UI take-up trends in this earlier period. 3 
Background

Aggregate Trends in Unemployment Insurance
The Federal-state UI program provides income support during spells of unemployment to workers in almost all sectors of the economy. Most of the research on UI participation is motivated by three features: (1) low levels of participation among those eligible; (2) large cross-state di¤erences in participation; and (3) long term declines in participation, particularly in the early 1980's. Two supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS) in 1989-90 and 1993 asked unemployed workers whether they had applied for UI bene…ts and, if not, why. As summarized in Wandner and Stettner (2000) , the most common reason for non-application was perceived ineligibility (mostly due to insu¢ cient work hours and/or earnings and quits) and optimistic job expectations. 5 Responses suggestive of lack of information ("Didn't know about UI or how to apply"), inconvenience ("Too much work or hassle"), or stigma ("Too much like charity or welfare") were relatively rare.
There is also considerable variation in UI participation across states and regions. Vroman (2002) investigates the sources of this variation and concludes that low participation is linked to high rates of misconduct determination and frequent eligibility determination by states. Unionization and the prevalence of employer-initiated claims tends to increase UI participation.
There has also been a fair amount of attention paid to the decline in aggregate UI participation over the past half century, particularly in the early 1980's. Blank and Card (1991) conclude that none of this recent decline is due to changes in eligibility. Instead, changes in the regional distribution of unemployment from high to low take-up states and declines in unionization explain most of the recent decline. Anderson and Meyer (1997) conclude that changes in the tax treatment of UI bene…ts accounts for most of the decline not explained by Blank and Card.
In contrast to declines observed in the 1980's, we estimated that aggregate UI take-up rate has increased slightly over the past decade and a half. Figure I plots our estimates of the fraction of unemployed workers that are eligible for UI, the fraction that are receiving UI bene…ts, and the implied take-up rate from 1989 to 2006 (the construction of these measures is described in Section 5). Fraction eligible and fraction on UI generally trend together -increasing during recessions 5 The surveys rely on self-reported perceived eligibility because an attempt to match survey respondants to administrative data that would enable actual eligibility determination was not successful. and falling during recovery. The gap between these series narrowed during the 1990's, particularly during the 2001 recession, increasing the take-up rate.
Coincident with this take-up increase, states made it much less burdensome to apply for UI bene…ts. Figure II plots the fraction of all initial UI claims that were …led using various methods from 1989 to 2006. Though nearly all initial claims for bene…ts were made in person in 1990, by 2006 only thirteen percent were. More than half of all initial claims are now made over the phone and more than thirty percent are …led on-line. While suggestive of a relationship between claiming ease and participation, this interpretation is obscured by changes in program generosity and the characteristics of unemployed workers during this period. Figure III plots the average maximum weekly bene…t amount UI recipients are eligible for and the fraction of unemployed workers that have a Bachelor's degree over time. UI generosity grew gradually during the 1990s and jumped considerably after 2000. The composition of unemployed workers also shifted, with the 2001 recession bringing in more educated workers into the ranks of the unemployed. These aggregate changes in program generosity and the characteristics of the unemployed (and potential UI eligible), both of which may a¤ect UI participation, motivate the cross-state analysis that follows.
Changes to UI Claiming Procedures
Since the program's inception in 1935, most workers who lost their job visited state-run local UI o¢ ces in order to …le their initial claim, certify that they were available for work, and con…rm that they were actively seeking employment. 6 In the mid-1990's, however, states began to implement procedures to receive initial UI claims over the telephone and many began to close UI o¢ ces.
The receipt of claims over the internet soon followed. Figure II masks considerable cross-state variation in timing of these policy changes which are important for our empirical approach. We use cross-state variation in the timing of these policy changes to identify the e¤ect of inconvenience on take-up. Figure IV plots the cumulative number of states that have introduced telephone and internet claiming or have closed UI o¢ ces by year. Colorado was the only state to o¤er phone initial claiming for the …rst half of the nineties, followed by Wisconsin in 1995 and Massachusetts and California in 1996. Phone claiming quickly took o¤, and by 2005 40 states accepted UI claims via 6 Due to the remote nature of many of its communities, Alaska has long permitted individuals to …le UI bene…ts through postal mail.
phone. Phone claiming was usually followed -often with a one to two-year lag -by the elimination of initial claims takers at UI o¢ ces. Internet claiming, introduced widely in 2000, was nearly as common as phone-claiming by 2005.
Cost reduction and improved customer service were the primary motivations for states' implementation of telephone and internet claiming. In their survey of seven early telephone claims adopters, Needels et al. (2000) , found that state UI administrators switched from in-person …ling at local UI o¢ ces to telephone claiming to reduce administrative costs and improve customer service. Important for the interpretation of our …ndings is whether phone and internet claiming is more convenient than in-person claiming since most states eliminated the in-person …ling option following the introduction of telephone claiming. 8 As reported in Needels et al. (2000) , customer satisfaction surveys in Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, and Wisconsin suggest that claimants overwhelmingly prefer telephone to in-person claiming. Eighty-six to ninety-six percent of respondents in these states, half of whom are former in-person …lers, report that telephone claiming is easier, more convenient, or faster. 9 The case of Massachusetts is also illustrative. Despite being given the option 7 One-Stop Centers provide other UI-related and job-search services. 8 At the time of this paper, there are no states that currently receive UI initial claims via the Internet exclusively. 9 In a nationwide survey of 2,773 claimants, Marcus and Frees (1998) report that respondents estimated it took to …le in-person, only 11% of individuals chose to do so in 2003. Kenyon et al. (2003) reports that claimants seem to be even more satis…ed with internet-based claiming, due to its convenience and speed. 10 Though far from conclusive, these anecdotes suggest that remote claiming methods are overwhelmingly preferred to in-person methods. Our method for estimating eligibility is described below. Finally, from the March CPS we obtain characteristics of the unemployed population in each year which we use as control variables in our regression analysis. All nominal values for earnings, wages, and bene…t amounts are converted to 2003 Dollars using the CPI-U. Table I provides summary statistics of our dataset.
Dating Policy Changes
We identi…ed the year in which states …rst o¤ered phone claiming, …rst o¤ered internet claiming, and …rst closed UI o¢ ces (eliminating in-person claiming) using three complementary approaches.
Identifying the conceptually appropriate date of implementation is complicated by the fact that some states piloted the initiatives in a few locations and/or phased in implementation across the state gradually. Our primary analysis relies on policy dates inferred from sharp changes in trends in the methods used to …le UI claims. For each state, we identi…ed the year that the share of claims …led via phone (or internet) accelerated by the greatest amount and designated this the event year. 12 This approach allows us to account for both slow phase-in and the presence of special-case 1 1 Since the sample is drawn from all claims in a given week, BAM overrepresents claimants with long durations. That is, they are weighted by weeks claimed. We also construct weights for the BAM sample using basic demographic information on the universe of all UI claimants also collected by the U.S. D.O.L. to ensure that our BAM sample matches the race-gender composition of claimants in each state-year. 1 2 We restricted it to years where this maximum acceleration exceeded …ve percentage points and where the share was increasing to prevent falsely recording minor blips as policy changes. individuals …ling by phone prior to its widespread implementation. 13 Putting an exact date on o¢ ce closure is also complicated by the gradual geographically-based phase-in of many of the closures.
We used the …rst year that in-person claims dropped below 20% as our o¢ ce closure date.
To verify our assignment of policy timing, we also contacted and interviewed 23 state UI o¢ ces directly, obtaining the dates of these three changes (if at all) and some qualitative information about the process (i.e. motivation and roll-out). We supplemented this information for six states using the dates reported in Needels (2000) and from press releases. Our third approach involves identifying the year that phone or internet claims exceed certain threshold of all claims. In this approach we designate the phone and internet claiming year to be the …rst year that each method exceeded 5% of all claims. O¢ ce closing year was the …rst year that in-person claims dropped below 10%.
The dates for each of these events for each state using the …rst two methods (imputed and interviews) are reported in Appendix Table AI. Overall the imputation seems to do a good job of capturing policy event dates: the correlation between imputed and interview-derived event dates are 0.95, 0.64, and 0.95 for phone claiming, internet claiming, and o¢ ce closure, respectively. We do not view the interview-derived dates as necessarily more preferable for quantifying the importance of time costs. If states implemented internet claiming without advertising it or working out system kinks, then low initial utilization of remote claiming implies negligible reduction in inconvenience.
Our preferred analysis relies on policy events that had large and sudden impacts on the methods workers used to …le a UI bene…t claim.
Estimating Eligibility
In order to examine take-up among those eligible (rather than total participation), we follow Blank and Card (1991) and estimate the fraction of unemployed persons that are eligible for unemployment insurance in each state and year using data from the March CPS. 14 Unemployed persons are deemed ineligible for …ve reasons: (1) current duration less than the required waiting period; (2) current duration exceeds the maximum; (3) quit last job; (4) not in a covered sector; and (5) insu¢ cient base period earnings. We use earnings in the previous calender year as our approximation of base 1 3 Most states accepted some applications over the phone in the case of very special circumstances prior to the widespread implementation of phone claiming for all individuals. 1 4 We are greatful to Brian McCall for generously sharing his code on UI eligibility regulations.
period earnings.
Take-up is calculated as the ratio between the fraction of unemployed persons receiving UI (from the DOL) to the estimated fraction that are eligible. It should be noted that since eligibility is measured with considerable error, our take-up rates sometime exceed one (in fact the maximum in our dataset is two). This partly re ‡ects systematic labor market di¤erences between states. Alaska, for instance, has many migrant oil …eld workers and always has a very high estimated take-up rate because many people live outside the state (in the CPS) but claim UI bene…ts from Alaska (where they work). State …xed e¤ects will net out these …xed di¤erences across states. Appendix Table   AII presents the correlation between the fraction of unemployed who are on UI with our estimate of the fraction of unemployed who are UI eligible, by state and year. Overall this correlation is 0.26, which should be much closer to one if eligibility were accurately measured.
Empirical Approach
We utilize cross-state variation in the timing of changes to UI claiming procedures to assess the importance of convenience to UI program participation. States implemented phone-and internetbased UI claiming at di¤erent times or sometimes not at all. This permits us to identify treatment e¤ects separately from aggregate year e¤ects and unobserved state characteristics, both of which may also in ‡uence take-up and claimant composition. We estimate the following simple reduced form model using ordinary least squares.
where P ostP hone i;t , P ostN et i;t , and P ostClose i;t are indicators for whether the observation is after the policy change. Program characteristics such as the maximum weekly bene…t amount are captured by B i;t and the characteristics of the unemployed population are captured by X i;t . The error term " i;t represents unmodeled determinants of take-up. The parameters of interest are p , n , and c , which can be interpreted as the e¤ect of having adopted remote UI claiming sometime in the past on UI take-up in the current period. We assume these e¤ects to be constant across states and over calendar time. When a full set of state and year e¤ects is included, these parameters are estimated on policy changes within states over time, net of any aggregate yearly changes in UI take-up common to all states. Fixed di¤erences in the levels of UI take-up across states will be absorbed into state …xed e¤ects. Any aggregate correlation between policy changes and takeup, such as increased take-up during the 2001 recession which coincided with the introduction of internet-claiming, will be absorbed into aggregate year e¤ects. In Equation (1), the unobserved counterfactual is implicitly estimated from individual state-level e¤ects (identi…ed by pre-event observations) and aggregate time trends (identi…ed by control states with no policy changes).
There has been recent attention paid to the consistency of standard errors in regression frameworks similar to ours due to the possible within-state serial correlation of outcome and policy variables. Following Bertrand et al. (2004), we allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance structure by estimating a clustered robust covariance matrix (e.g. clustered by state). We also utilize a non-parametric permutation test which assigns placebo patterns of treatment status to states and uses the empirical distribution of estimated coe¢ cients from many of these placebo treatments for inference.
We can foresee at least two challenges to our identi…cation strategy. First, states may have implemented other reforms that may also a¤ect take-up (e.g. expanded outreach) concurrent with changes to claiming methods. Depending on the nature of the reform, omitted variable bias may over-or under-state the true causal e¤ect. Our review of the literature and discussion with state UI administrators did not reveal any concurrent policy changes, but this cannot be entirely ruled out. 15 A second problem is policy endogeneity. State administrators may adopt more automated claiming methods in response to higher anticipated demand placed on program resources due to higher anticipated take-up. If so, our estimates will be biased upwards. We address this concern by estimating "event study" models with leading and lagging treatment indicators, so that we can observe pre-event trends in the outcome variables. To implement this, we estimate the following model using ordinary least squares:
where P honeEvent s i;t is an indicator for time relative to the introduction of phone claiming.
P honeEvent s i;t equals one if state i implemented phone claiming in period t s (where s can be positive or negative), and zero otherwise. N etEvent s i;t and CloseEvent s i;t are de…ned similarly.
Coe¢ cients on the policy event time indicators, s p , measure the di¤erences between actual and predicted outcomes in the current period, having implemented the policy s years earlier (if s > 0).
For instance, 0 p is the take-up increase during the …rst year phone claiming was introduced relative to it not being implemented. These are the parameters of interest.
Results
E¤ects on Claiming Method and Administrative Costs
Though some states phased in phone claiming over time, on average adoption was pretty rapid.
Figures AI to AIII in the Appendix plot the fraction of claims …led in person, by phone, and over the internet separately for each state. To characterize the average pattern of adoption across all states, we …rst estimate Equation (2) using the fraction using each …ling method as dependent variables and plot the coe¢ cients in Figure VIl and is now positive, but is still close to zero. Column (3) includes the real maximum bene…t amount (in $100) to account for any changes in the generosity of the UI system that happen to coincide with the adoption of remote claiming. The estimated coe¢ cients are una¤ected by this inclusion.
E¤ects on Aggregate Take-up
Column (4) includes controls for various characteristics of the unemployed population from the CPS, including pre-unemployment average hourly wage, education, demographics, and recent labor market experience (weeks worked last year and weeks looking for work). These controls are generally insigni…cant, though the coe¢ cient on weeks spent looking for work is negative, likely re ‡ecting the exhaustion of (and ineligibility for) UI bene…ts during extended periods of unemployment. Our estimates in this preferred speci…cation allows us to rule out positive e¤ects of 0.024 and 0.016 percentage points for phone-and internet-claiming respectively.
Accounting for eligibility
While the controls included in speci…cation (4) of Table III may partially account for changes in eligibility, Table IV o¤ers another approach. In these speci…cations, we use the estimated takeup rate as a dependent variable. This is calculated as the ratio of the fraction of unemployed people on UI (from administrative sources) to the fraction of unemployed people eligible for UI (estimated from the March CPS). We believe that the denominator is estimated with considerable error, introducing quite a bit of noise into our outcome measure. 17 This will decrease our precision considerably, but should not introduce any systematic bias into our estimates if this measurement error is uncorrelated with our explanatory variables.
Accounting for eligibility has little e¤ect on our conclusions, though the point estimates are now negative for both phone-and internet-based claiming and greater in magnitude. Since the mean of take-up is a little more than twice as large as the fraction of unemployed on UI, the coe¢ cients should be divided by 2.2 to make them comparable to Figure III . Even with this correction, the coe¢ cients are larger in magnitude when take-up is used as the dependent variable. As expected, standard errors are much larger due to eligibility measurement error. Together with the evidence in Table III , we conclude that neither phone-nor internet-based claiming has an appreciable impact on participation in UI. We …nd weak evidence that increasing the real maximum bene…t amount results in higher participation, though our estimates are not statistically signi…cant.
Permutation test for inference
To test the robustness of our inference, for our main speci…cation we implement a non-parametric permutation test which assigns placebo patterns of treatment status to states and uses the empirical distribution of estimated e¤ects from many of these placebo treatments for inference. This method is discussed by Johnston and DiNardo (1997, Chapter 11.2) and Bertrand, Du ‡o, and Mullainathan (2002) but has not found widespread use in the di¤erence-in-di¤erence literature. 18 The bene…t of this approach is that we do not have to specify anything about the structure of the error term, instead relying on the treatment randomization assumption (conditional on covariates).
To implement the test, we randomly assign each state one of the full treatment patterns of another state: fP ostP hone i;t ; P ostN et i;t ; P ostClose i;t g, drawing without replacement. Since six of the patterns are shared by two states each, there are 51! 2 6 possible permutations of states with treatments. We then estimate Equation (1) using the placebo treatment patterns with OLS, storing the coe¢ cient estimates b p j , b n j , and b c j , where j denotes the jth randomization. This process is repeated a large number of times. De…ne F(.) to be the empirical distribution of these placebo treatment e¤ect estimates. To test the hypothesis that our estimates using actual policy dates are statistically di¤erent from 0, we observe where they fall on the F(.) distribution. The 95% con…dence interval, for instance, is given by the b : j that fall between the 0.025 and 0.975 percentiles of F(.). Figure IX plots the empirical distribution of b p j and b n j using 5,000 randomizations of treatment assignment. The dashed vertical line is the point estimate from the base preferred model (Table 3 column (4)). For both phone and internet claiming, the point estimate is well within the distribution of point estimates from the placebo assignments. The 95% con…dence interval is denoted by the solid vertical lines. The width of this con…dence interval is very similar to that derived using our state-clustered standard errors.
Event study estimates
In order to identify any pre-existing trends in take-up that may bias our di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimates, we estimated Equation (2) both with and without indicators for year relative to o¢ ce closure. Figure X plots the coe¢ cients from these regressions along with 95% con…dence intervals.
For phone claiming, there are no pre-event trends in participation regardless of whether o¢ ce closure is controlled for and the coe¢ cients lie on the zero line. This suggests that phone claiming was implemented during a time that was "typical" for states. There appears to be a moderate short-term increase in participation following the introduction of phone-claiming, but the estimate of this increase is very imprecise and not di¤erent from zero. Internet claiming, however, may have been implemented during a period of atypically low UI participation, as suggested by the negative and downward-trending pre-event coe¢ cients. Though the con…dence intervals are wide, our results on internet claiming should be interpreted with caution. There also appears to be a short-term increase in participation coinciding with internet claiming, but again this increase is not signi…cant at conventional levels.
Other robustness checks
Table V presents several di¤erent checks on the robustness of our main …ndings using the fraction of unemployed on UI as our dependent variable. Column (1) just repeats our preferred base model estimates from Table 3 , column (4). In speci…cation (2), we include state-speci…c linear time trends to account for trends at the state level that are not picked up by aggregate year e¤ects and the timevarying covariates we've included. This increases the magnitude of the phone and internet claiming e¤ects, but both are still insigni…cant and fall within the original con…dence intervals. In (3) we instead include a linear time trend interacted with baseline demographic and labor market variables from the 1990 Census: median household income, fraction rural, fraction nonwhite, fraction with BA, unemployment rate, and not-in-labor force rate. This inclusion changes our results very little from the base case.
Speci…cations (4) and (5) use alternative methods for identifying the years that states implemented phone and internet claiming and closed UI o¢ ces. Speci…cation (4) restricts analysis to only those states we were able to interview about the timing of their remote claims. The coe¢ cient for phone claiming is unchanged but the coe¢ cient on internet claiming is now large and negative, but imprecise and we cannot reject that it is equal to zero. Identifying policy events as the …rst year that phone/internet claims pass a 5% threshold (column 5) produces similar results as the base case.
The …nal speci…cations restrict the sample in di¤erent ways. One advantage of the staggered timing of policy adoption is that treatment e¤ects can be estimated exclusively on the sample of states that adopted the policy, excluding control states that never adopt. Speci…cations (6) and (7) use only states that eventually implemented phone claiming and internet claiming, respectively. In these speci…cations, later adopters serve as controls for earlier adopters. The estimated e¤ects are larger when the sample is restricted to adopters, particularly for the policy (phone or internet) whose enactment the sample is conditioned on, but they are still insigni…cant. Speci…cation (8) restricts the sample to post-1994 observations for states that had not yet implemented phone claiming by 1997. The intent is to estimate the state …xed e¤ects using pre-treatment data that is closer to the date the policy changes actually happened. The estimates using this restricted sample are nearly identical to the base case.
E¤ects on UI Recipient Characteristics
If the policy changes a¤ected potential UI recipients di¤erentially -say because lower income claimants preferred speaking directly to UI workers or had limited internet access -then we may see changes in recipient characteristics even in the absence of aggregate take-up changes. Table   VI presents regression results where various characteristics of UI recipients are used as the dependent variables. We include a full set of controls for characteristics of unemployed people in each regression. Column (1) examines the fraction of UI recipients that are receiving the maximum bene…t amount. Raising the maximum bene…t level mechanically reduces this fraction, while weeks worked in the previous year (which in ‡uences potential bene…t levels) increases it. Both phone and internet claiming are positively related to the fraction at the maximum and the coe¢ cient on internet claiming is di¤erent from zero at the 95% level of con…dence.
Column (2) examines the fraction of UI recipients that have a college degree. If college graduates have greater facility with the internet or easier eligibility determination over the phone, we may see a shift towards more college graduates following the adoption of these claiming methods. We …nd no evidence for such a shift. The point estimates are close to zero and statistically insigni…cant.
In column (3), we use average real pre-unemployment hourly wage as the dependent variable.
This provides a direct test of the time cost explanation for incomplete take-up if time spent applying for bene…ts is more costly to workers with higher wages. While the positive coe¢ cients on the policy variables are consistent with this explanation, the estimates are small ($0.03 to $0.22 on a base of $13.83) and insigni…cant. If increased convenience primarily a¤ects those whose time is most valuable, then we may expect to see greater e¤ects higher on the wage distribution. Columns (4) to (7) address this issue, by using di¤erent log wage percentiles of UI recipients as the dependent variable. The estimated e¤ects of introducing phone-and internet-based claiming methods is consistently small and insigni…cant across the wage distribution. In the context of …nding only one signi…cant change in the UI recipient population (fraction at maximum bene…t amount) with the introduction of remote claiming, we conclude that increased …ling ease had minimal impact on the characteristics of UI recipients.
Conclusion and Discussion
Our analysis suggests that states' adoption of remote forms of UI claiming (phone and internet) did not have an appreciable impact on UI participation and take-up. At face value, this …nding is inconsistent with a time-and transaction-cost explanation for low take-up if remote UI claiming is indeed less time-intensive, as claimant surveys suggest. Sigma is also potentially less important in the UI context since the program is not means-tested. However, our estimates are su¢ ciently imprecise such that we cannot rule out moderate e¤ects of a few percentage point increase in take-up rates. Large to moderate e¤ects for a small population of marginal claimants may not show up in state aggregate take-up rates. This possibility underscores the importance of testing for heterogeneous e¤ects. The evidence on whether claimant characteristics changed with the advent of remote claiming is also weak. We conclude that neither the adoption of phone nor internet claiming shifted the characteristics of UI claimants. States appear to have made considerable changes in administrative procedures and achieved substantial payroll cost reductions without a measurable impact on UI participation. This …nding di¤ers from that of Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches (2007) , who …nd that the introduction of electronic tax …ling had a large e¤ect on EITC participation. We speculate that di¤erences in the role of intermediaries (e-…le occurs primarily through private tax preparers) and information (e-…ling provides information about EITC eligibility) may be important contextual di¤erences between their study and ours. Movement to a system of employer-initiated automatic enrollment in unemployment insurance following job loss may be closer to the changes they examine than the ones we do and may be expected to have much larger e¤ects. Future research about the role of program features and information on participation is needed. Recent randomized …eld experiments funded by H&R Block to test for presentation and inconvenience e¤ects on participation in Food Stamps, federal …nancial student aid, and several other social programs holds particular promise. 
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